Numenware readers are busy people. So here’s a handy, one-paragraph summary of Daniel C. Dennett’s new book, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, to save you the hours required to plow through its 400 pages and the $25.95 you’d have to spend to buy it:

I’m Daniel Dennett, and I think religion is stupid, and everybody should stop believing in it right now, because I’m real smart and I say so. Besides, it’s just an evolutionary and cultural thing according to some books I read. Don’t get me wrong, though: some of my best friends are religious, and a lot of them are real nice people!

Dennett spends the first chapter talking about an alleged vast conspiracy striving to prevent people like him from looking at religion objectively . That’s odd, given the centuries of research on the topic.

Dennett argues vociferously for a scientific analysis of religion. Which is doubly odd, since he’s obviously made up his mind already. And the only scientific “evidence” he himself quotes is cribbed from people who actually did work on the topic, such as Boyer (earlier post) and Atran (earlier post). He gives a sloppy summary of their work.

Triply odd is what Dennett leaves out of his “daring and important” new book, which is anything about what people experience in religion. He fails to mention, much less categorize or analyze, any transcendental experiences beyond those of the beautiful sunset variety.

Dennett gives short shrift to the biological seat of religious experience—the brain. His treatment of the topic is limited to the mention of one paragraph in Atran’s book. He dismisses D’Aquili and his “AUB” (Absolute Unitary Being) concept with its neural correlates in a single sentence.

The book is desperately in need of a fact checker, an editor, or, preferably, a ghost writer. Dennett is unable to maintain one train of thought for one section, much less an entire chapter. The book is cluttered with distracting soliloquies and asides. He doesn’t understand the concept of a scientific theory, imagining that it becomes a “fact” after it’s “proven”. He calls Jared Diamond a “pioneer who did scientific work on religion.” He refers to “Shinto temples of surreal intricacy and precision” (Shinto has shrines, not temples, and they’re austere in the extreme). He conflates the evolutionary and cultural aspects of the development of religion by treating genes and memes, of which he is much enamored (to the point of including in the book a disconnected appendix in their defense), as equivalent selective mechanisms.

Dennett thinks that a historical account developed is equivalent to understanding what it means—an odd stance for America’s putative leading philosopher.

Dennett waves off criticsm with gratuitous displays of feigned modesty, weak calls for “further inquiry”, and, in the ultimate irony, pre-emptive attacks on those who might disagree—proclaiming some of them infidels unworthy of even casting their eyes on his holy writ.

It’s really too bad. Someone with Dennett’s intellect and clout could have written a book on this timely topic that would really have changed the terms of the discussion . Myopic, slovenly, repetitive, disorganized, and biased, this book disastrously fails to fulfill that promise .

Glossolalia, or speaking in tongues, is a fascinating phenomenon with huge potential for teaching us more about the relationship between the brain and religion. Glossolalistic behavior has been reported in a wide variety of cultures, including Tibet, and is thus by no means specific to Christianity. Julian Jaynes (previous post), not surprisingly, positions it in the context of his bicameral brain theories. (Recent research supports this—showing greater right-brain activation after glossalalic episodes.)

Jaynes emphasizes that speaking in tongues inevitably happens in the context of groups and religious services, after various “induction” procedures such as prayer or ritual, and in the presence of strong charismatic figure. His explanation is that these factors are necessary to produce what he calls the “collective cognitive imperative” necessary to go into a deep trance.

The behavior is also widely viewed as being learned, whether consciously or not. Some researchers think it can be learned outside of a religious context: Nicholas Spanos found that 20% of subjects began speaking in tongues spontaneously after listening to genuine samples, the number rising to 70% after further training. Other reports are that people who learn glossolallia in a religious setting can then perform it anywhere, even while driving a car.

Jaynes cites research that glossolalics of any language, and from any religion, make the same, meaningless sounds, which are not human language but rather a pseudo-language, or, less charitably, “babbling”. The use of the term “babbling” is interesting because it’s often applied to babies’ speech acts, and some researchers believe that glossolalia is indeed a form of linguistic regression. They point out the the number of vowels and consonants uses is restricted (by one account, an average of only six phonemes used compared to the 30 typical of adult language).

Jaynes’ neurological explanation is that “rhythmical discharges from subcortical strcutures are coming into play, released by the trance state of lesser cortical control.”

All of the above, however, would seem to be overly objective in nature. Glossalalics themselves report a feeling of release and happiness after episodes—peace, joy, and inner harmony are some of the words that have been used (some also self-report that their speech was meaningful). Perhaps the relaxed, restored body/brain state resulting from speaking in tongues is related to that achieved through meditative practice. Maybe the practice ties into the neurochemical reward structure. (Other effects reported include relief of pain and a strengthened immune system.)

This is somewhat consistent with 1 Corinthians 14:1-14, where Paul emphasizes that a person who speaks in tongues is talking to “God”, and will grow spiritually in the process.

Art courtesy of Ola Rinta-Koski . Larger version is here.

Grumpiness alert. In a post on his Hardcore Zen blog, Brad Warner is pitching the Nishijima/Cross translation of Shobogenzo:

In case anybody’s been looking for the Gudo Nishijima / Chodo Cross translation of Dogen’s Shobogenzo and couldn’t find it, or else found it for a ridiculously high price, check out the link below or click on the title of this article. The full four volume set is now available through Amazon.com at just $23.99 per volume.

This is the best, most reliable English translation of the complete Shobogenzo that ever has been or ever will be produced. I’ve sat down with the Japanese version and this translation open to the same passage a great number of times and it’s like someone gave you magic glasses that enabled you to read exactly what the original Japanese text says in crystal clear English. You cannot do this with any other edition.

It’s great to see this available once again. Buy a set or be a loser!

I suppose it’s the “best” translation of the complete Shobogenzo because it’s the only one currently in print (the Nishiyama/Stevens translation, the only other complete translation, is out of print). As for whether or not it’s the best that “will ever be produced,” I guess Zen masters must be able to foresee the future. As for whether it’s the best in terms of the translation of any particular fascicle which has been translated elsewhere, the anwer is—far from it.

These “magic glasses” give us text like the following (from Bendowa):

When the budda-tathagatas, each having received the one-to-one transmission of the splendid Dharma, experience the supreme state of bodhi, they posess a subtle method which is supreme and without intention.

Which parses the Japanese incorrectly, interprets it wrongly, and renders it into broken English. Chodo Cross has referred to the work of translating Shobogenzo, or rather Nishijima’s modern Japanese translation of it, as “donkey work.” Let’s just say—that attitude shows.

It’s odd that Brad, who espouses a modern, in in-your-face brand of Zen, would be so attached to this overly literal, tired translation.

Western Zen students would be far better off with one of the Cook translations, such as How to Raise an Ox, or Sounds of Valley Streams . Or, one hopes, at some point, a fluent, informed, new definitive translation.

Neuroplasticity is a plausible—some might say obvious—hypothesis for the mechanism by which humans develop spiritually. For instance, the relatively slow speed of neurogenesis would account for the time required under development protocols such as meditation.

Now, Harvard scientists have identified a brain protein that may be responsible for the lack of plasticity in the adult brain—at least in rodents. Mutant mice lacking the protein, even after reaching adulthood, migrated eye function in the brain when the poor animals had one of their eyes sewn shut and light shined into the other, something heretofore seen only in young mice.

As reported in Science Express, the researchers found that mutant mice lacking a protein called PirB have more robust “cortical ocular dominance (OD) plasticity” at all ages. They note that “PirB is also expressed in many other regions of the CNS, suggesting that it may function broadly to stabilize neural circuits.”

Perhaps promotion of neuroplasticity will be one focus of future development of neurotheopharmaceuticals.

See also the press release, and Techorati links .

Image: neurons grown in culture and labeled to measure plasticity in a living system (courtesy of Liu Laboratory, MIT Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences)

Zen-Brain Reflections is James H. Austin’s follow-up to his definitive Zen and the Brain. As always, Austin is learned and thorough. The book has great value. It is almost certainly the best survey of research in the field of neurotheology, or perhaps we should use Davidson’s term “contemplative neuroscience.” But ultimately it’s closer to a set of research notes than a book. It presents tantalizing ideas and intriuging possibilities, but few hypotheses or frameworks. We’re left with a lot of information, but little understanding.

According to the description:

Zen-Brain Reflections takes up where the earlier book left off. It addresses such questions as: can neuroimaging studies localize the sites where our notions of self arise? How can the latest brain imaging methods monitor meditators more effectively? How do long years of meditative training plus brief enlightened states produce pivotal transformations in the physiology of the brain? Austin reviews the latest studies on the amygdala, frontotemporal interactions, and paralimbic extensions of the limbic system. He then explores different states of consciousness, both the early superficial absorptions and the later, major “peak experiences.”

Do people see God in their dreams? If so, this could contribute to our understanding of how humans view the divine.

Let’s assume we understand the relationship between people’s view of the world when awake and when sleeping. If we then look at how people see God in their dreams, we can map that to a view of God during their waking consciousness.

Personally, I don’t experience the divine during my dreams. But I have some insight during my processes of perception while dreaming. I have an overall sense of what’s happening, but with a relatively vague focus. For instance, I may sense the presence of a group of people, but I don’t see their individual faces in detail. But if I decide to zoom in on them—much like a digital camera zoom—I can then see details. Recently I dreamt I saw a garden, but only vaguely the flower beds—until I zoomed in on them and saw individual petals. During my dreams I do not walk, but rather float. That’s rather convenient, since I can drift over walls and descend the sides of buildings. I also note that I am separate from myself in dreams; my character goes ahead of me, but then I follow it.

Let’s collect information on what people see of God during their dreams, and use our knowledge about the nature of dreams to map that back to equivalent non-dreaming divine experiences.

A major milestone: a machine has consistently defeated very strong humans at at the game of “go” (report here ). The caveat is that this is on a 7×7 board, which is dozens of orders of magnitude less complex than the full 19×19 game.

Crazy Stone, the program in question, used the so-called Monte Carlo technique. Basically, it plays hundreds of thousands of random games and finds which move leads to the highest winning percentage. An interesting Wired article on this approach is here. A server allows bots to play thousands of games of each other, providing real-time information on the degree of promise of various approaches.

The real question is whether this is a one-trick pony useful only for tiny boards, or whether it can be usefully extended to 19×19. Until 20 years gives us immensely more powerful computers, we need some kind of abstraction to serve as the topic of Monte Carlo simulations. Or, perhaps Monte Carlo can be another trick in the go programmer’s bag of tricks, somehow combined with the opening books and connectivity analysis and pattern matching and heuristics that serve as the basis of today’s strongest 19×19 programs.

Scientific American Mind (website) has a brief article on the science of meditation in its February/March 2006 issue which may be worth a look. But gee, why can’t the editors find a writer who actually knows the field, and devote more than two pages to the topics?

Consider the following:

Neuroscientists have shown that by altering brain-wave patterns, meditation purges negative thoughts.

Umm, not exactly.

What if a person could add 20 minutes of meditation, twice a day, to his deaily routine of 309 minutes on the treadmill and achieve physical and mental harmony?

Well Gee whiz. Why did it take mankind 10,000 years to figure that out?

What is more, if he (Clifford Saron, a UC Davis researcher who wants to do a one-year “Biosphere”-like study of meditators) can identify a brain region that brings about inner peace…

Yep, if we could just find that region…it must be there somewhere!

Picture credit: NOVARTIS VISIONS OF SCIENCE 2003/TOM BARRICK

This image, entitled Pathways of the Mind, was created at St George’s Hospital Medical School by Tom Barrick, using a magnetic resonance imaging scanner that measures the way in which water moves around the brain. It was one of the prize winners in the Visions of Science photographic awards.

http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/content/vol331/issue7522/images/small/17926.gif

Japan has inexplicably decided to experiment with copying one of the worst aspects of the American legal system: juries.

As reported in the NYT earlier this month, the new system, to be introduced in 2009, involves citizens called “saiban-in” (“lay assessors”) who will sit on panels together with judges on the more serious cases.

The Supreme Court recently ruled that it was OK for relatives of a murder victim to sit in court with big buttons featuring the face of the deceased, and that this did not unduly influence the jury. (Carey vs. Musladin.) Maybe or maybe not. But this case raises the deeper issue of how we can possibly know what does or does not influence a jury. Do they really get “innocent until proven guilty”, or even “beyond a reasonable doubt”? I doubt it.

The Founders were quite certain that the jury system was important. After all, they wrote it into the Bill of Rights not once, not twice, but three times. But let’s remember: they were reacting to very particular abuses of the judicial system under colonial English rule. Juries were the only way to absolutely prevent such misuse of government power. And recall, the jurors back then were landed and educated.

There’s no need for a jury system in America today. We call up people with no expertise whatsoever and waste their time to help us condemn one of our underclass to prison for a decade for possessing a rock of cocaine.

There are those who say juries form a key part of the democratic system. The author of the NYT article goes so far as to say “if Japan’s effort to introduce a jury system fails, democracy movements elsewhere in Asia will suffer a serious setback.” But representational democracy and the jury system are similar only in the superficial sense that they involve citizen participation.

The article goes on to say that “it’s hard to imagine how Americans could fulfill their role as democracy advocates any better than by helping the Japanese become jurors.” Well, I don’t think the Japanese need any lessons from us in democracy. If we really wanted to help them become more democratic, why not push for a nationwide referendum on the US troops in Okinawa and elsehwere in Japan, then insist that the two governments actually abide by the results?

Do kids naturally believe in an afterlife, or is it something they’re taught? Jesse Bering from the University of Arkansas has developed some clever experiments to find the answers to questions like these, described in a recent issue of American Scientist.

For instance, Bering would tell the kids a fable about a mouse eaten by an alligator, and then ask them what kinds of physical or mental functions they thought the dead mouse retained. He found the answers lay along a spectrum—almost none of the kids thought the mouse would be eating something after death (biological behavior), bur increasing numbers thought it might feel hunger, sense something, feel something, want something, or know something. Interestingly, it also took the kids longer to decide as they progressed down this spectrum.

And the younger the children, the more behaviors and feelings they attributed to the dead mouse. The implication here is key: belief in supernatural things is not simply based on cultural indoctrination but is somehow intrinsic in the kids’ young minds. More acculturation—and/or just growing up—actually reduces the tendency to supernatural belief.

Bering’s overall stance on the origin of religion and belief in the supernatural is that it was originally a natural outgrowth of humans systems for making inferences about intentional agents (compare this to Boyer, who emphasizes that the idea of dead people doing things is “memorable” due to its counterintuitiveness). The belief in the supernatural was then found adaptive and selected for due to its effect in preventing people from engaging in destructive behaviors even when they would not be caught.